Moral hazard in welfare economics: on the advantage of Planner's advices to manage employees' actions. - Département de mathématiques appliquées Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2017

Moral hazard in welfare economics: on the advantage of Planner's advices to manage employees' actions.

Résumé

In this paper, we study moral hazard problems in contract theory by adding an exogenous Planner to manage the actions of Agents hired by a Principal. We provide conditions ensuring that Pareto optima exist for the Agents using the scalarization method associated with the multi-objective optimization problem and we solve the problem of the Principal by finding optimal remunerations given to the Agents. We illustrate our study with a linear-quadratic model by comparing the results obtained when we add a Planner in the Principal/multi-Agents problem with the results obtained in the classical second-best case. More particularly in this example, we give necessary and sufficient conditions ensuring that Pareto optima are Nash equilibria and we prove that the Principal takes the benefit of the action of the Planner in some cases.
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Dates et versions

hal-01504473 , version 1 (10-04-2017)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-01504473 , version 1

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Thibaut Mastrolia. Moral hazard in welfare economics: on the advantage of Planner's advices to manage employees' actions.. 2017. ⟨hal-01504473⟩
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